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Abstract. Effective risk management is crucial for any organisation.
One of its key steps is risk identification, but few tools exist to support
this process. Here we present a method for the automatic discovery of a
particular type of process-related risk, the danger of deadline transgres-
sions or overruns, based on the analysis of event logs. We define a set of
time-related process risk indicators, i.e., patterns observable in event logs
that highlight the likelihood of an overrun, and then show how instances
of these patterns can be identified automatically using statistical princi-
ples. To demonstrate its feasibility, the approach has been implemented
as a plug-in module to the process mining framework ProM and tested
using an event log from a Dutch financial institution.
1 Introduction
Effective risk management is crucial for organisations. ISO Guide 73:2009 defines
risk as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” where effect is “a deviation
from the expected — positive and/or negative” [3]. One of the most important
aspects of risk management is risk identification [7]. Traditional risk management
approaches offer only high-level guidance about risk identification methods and
rely on the knowledge of domain experts [7]. Accordingly, our goal is to show how
the data recorded in event logs by contemporary workflow management systems
can be exploited for the purpose of risk identification.
Various approaches for predicting timeliness have been proposed in the lit-
erature [8, 9] and serve as a starting point for our work. Van der Aalst et al.’s
approach [8] builds an annotated transition system and remaining process time
is then predicted based on the average of earlier cases visiting the same state.
Van Dongen et al.’s approach [9] predicts the remaining cycle time of a case
by using non-parametric regression based on case-related data as the predictor
variables. A framework for identification and analysis of the operational risks
associated with single business process activities, as well as a whole process, was
proposed by Jallow et al. [4]. Wickboldt et al. proposed a framework that makes
use of a process model and process execution data from historical records for risk
prediction [10]. The use of process mining for the identification of transactional
fraud risk was proposed by Jans et al. [5]. Overall, our approach differs from
previous work in that: it does not require as an input risk indicators defined by
experts or pre-classified data [4, 10]; it is not restricted to transactional fraud
risk [5]; and it focuses on identifying the risk of not meeting a deadline rather
than estimating the remaining cycle time of a case [8, 9].
Since our approach is based on actual data in event logs, it focuses on process-
related risks only. We refer to a risk as process-related if its root cause is any
combination of process behaviour (notably the activities performed and their
sequence), resource behaviour (e.g., resource availability, capabilities and inter-
action patterns) or case-related data. Process-related risks can jeopardise the
achievement of process goals in terms of cost, timeliness or the quality of out-
puts [4]. In this paper we consider only one type of risk, the likelihood that cases
do not meet their deadline, however our general strategy is not restricted to
time-related risks. Our approach consists of three steps: 1) definition of Process
Risk Indicators (PRIs); 2) devising a way to identify instances of risk patterns
in a log; and 3) defining a predictor function that characterises the risk of a case
failing (from its local characteristics only).
2 Risk Identification Method
Before introducing our Process Risk Indicators (PRIs), we first introduce some
notations. Let α denote a run of a process model. Random variable Xα denotes
a case’s outcome in terms of timeliness per run α. In this paper, we assume
that Xα takes one of two possible values: 1 if a case is delayed and 0 if it is
completed in time. Per run α there is cumulative distribution function Fα such
that Fα(x) = P (Xα ≤ x) for Xα. In this way the risk of case delay can be
quantified. Function Fα captures both impact and likelihood. Assuming that a
process is in a steady state there exists such a function Fα for all runs. Our goal
is to define a function G that predicts the value of Xα, i.e., we would like to
minimize the expected value of the difference |Xα −Gα|. Function Gα is based
on a few local characteristics of α. Let E denote the set of all possible events.
A trace is a sequence of events δ ∈ E∗. An event log L is a set of traces. We
assume that each event has the following attributes: an activity name, a time
stamp, a resource and a transaction type (including start and complete). Each
case is described by a trace δ ∈ L which can be related to a process model run.
Using indicators for risk monitoring is a common practice in areas such
as safety and fraud detection, so we use “risk indicators” for identification of
process-related risks. We define a Process Risk Indicator as a pattern observable
in an event log whose presence indicates a higher likelihood of some process-
related risk. In this paper we consider only the risk of a case overrun. Our aim
is to identify domain-independent indicators that can be identified by analysing
event logs and do not require any additional information, e.g. a process model.
We have defined five time-related PRIs.
– PRI 1: Abnormal activity execution time. A case contains an activity
whose duration is significantly higher than its normal duration.
– PRI 2: Abnormal waiting time. Activity execution is not started for an
abnormally long period of time after it has been enabled.
– PRI 3: Multiple activity repetitions. An activity is repeated multiple
times in a case.
– PRI 4: Atypical activities. A case contains an activity that has not been
performed often previously.
– PRI 5: Multiple resource involvement. The number of resources in-
volved in a case significantly exceeds the norm.
Our method for PRI discovery is based on unsupervised statistical techniques
for outlier identification. They have the advantage of not requiring pre-classified
data samples for learning. We use the “sample standard deviations” approach
for outlier detection which assumes that the sampled values follow a normal
distribution. A cut-off threshold for a normally distributed population is usually
defined as µ± 2σ (for a 95% confidence interval). Observations whose values are
outside this range are considered outliers. If a sample contains extreme outliers
a cut-off threshold defined by the mean x and standard deviation s is often
unnecessarily biased, so for a normally distributed population the median x˜ is a
robust estimator for x and a robust estimator for s is 1.483MAD [6]. Our method
for PRI identification consists of two steps: (1) Identify a cut-off threshold by
analysing the given event log; and (2) For a given case (represented by a trace)
identify outliers using the learned threshold. For each trace δ ∈ L we introduce
attributes for each risk indicator n, denoted PRIn. These attributes are used by
the risk identification method to store information about the indicators found
in a trace. Attribute PRIn is 1 if indicator n is found, and 0 otherwise.
Following Zhang et al. [11], we assume that activity durations follow a log-
normal distribution, therefore logarithms of activity durations approximately
follow a normal distribution. To identify the presence of PRI1 in a trace belong-
ing to a run α of the process model, the following procedure is followed. For every
activity a occurring in at least one trace corresponding to α: create a sample x
of logarithms of the durations of all occurrences of a in traces corresponding to
α (difference between complete and start events); calculate a cut-off threshold
t = x+ 2s; for a given activity instance compare logarithm of its duration with
the threshold t and if it exceeds the threshold set the value of the corresponding
case’s attribute PRI1 = 1. A similar procedure is followed for other PRIs. For
PRI2 we also assume that waiting times follow a log-normal distribution [11].
The waiting time is calculated as the difference between the end time and the
start time of two consecutive activities in a log. Importantly, this assumption
may not always be true. For PRI3 and PRI5 we assume that the number of ac-
tivity executions in a case and the number of resources involved in a case follow
a normal distribution. An activity is considered atypical (PRI4) if it has been
executed in fewer than a certain number of cases in the log. The threshold t is an
input parameter that represents the fraction of cases where a particular activity
has been executed.
We define a predictor function G that estimates the risk level of a case based
on the risk indicators it exhibits. Thus binary function G predicts a delay if
any of the indicators is found in a case. We have also defined a function Score
that returns a “suspicion score” based on the number of identified indicators
for each case. A high suspicion score means that many indicators were found
in a case, and can be used to calibrate risk alert levels. Let δ be a trace that
represents a given case, δ(PRIn) denote the value of attribute PRIn of trace









In our current implementation once a risk indicator is identified we update
the corresponding attribute of a trace. Functions G and Score are calculated for
each complete trace and the values are compared with actual case durations to
evaluate the performance of the functions.
3 Experimental Results
Our approach has been implemented as a plug-in of the process mining frame-
work ProM 6. Its main functionality is to identify occurrences of our five PRIs
in a given log and to thus predict the likelihood of a case being delayed. Pre-
dicted values are then compared with the actual outcome of a case to evaluate
the performance of the predictor functions. In order to isolate traces correspond-
ing to different process model runs the plug-in uses either the existing ProM 6
“replay” plug-in [1] or the trace clustering plug-in [2] (if the process model is
not available). We evaluated our approach using an event log which represents
the application process for a personal loan or overdraft from a Dutch financial
institution given for the BPI Challenge 2012.3 The log contains 13,087 traces
in total and we first filtered this log to produce 934 traces suited to our exper-
imental purposes. The plug-in that uses the trace clustering was applied. The
filtered log was grouped into 12 clusters with the total number of traces in each
cluster ranging from 20 to 206. After clustering, the traces in each cluster were
put into either a training set (used to learn cut-off thresholds) or a test set. For
each cluster within the training set we estimated the normal case duration as
x˜+ 2 ∗ 1.483 ∗MAD . Cases whose durations exceeded this value were considered
to be delayed.
Table 1 shows the experimental results for the test set of 462 traces. To
evaluate the quality of predictions we used the mean absolute error (MAE). This
is calculated as 1n
∑n
i=1 |pi−ri| for both delayed cases (yielding the MAE for false
negatives) and for cases that are in time (yielding the MAE for false positives),
where n is the number of cases in each category and pi and ri denote predicted
and real values respectively. We calculated the MAE separately for delayed cases
and cases that are on time, because it is often important to distinguish between
different types of errors, both false-negatives and false-positives, as their impact
3 BPI Challenge 2012. doi:10.4121/uuid:3926db30-f712-4394-aebc-75976070e91f
Table 1. Experimental results showcasing the predictive value of five process risk
indicators (PRIs) on the test set of the BPI Challenge event log.
5 PRIs PRI 1 PRI 2 PRI 3 PRI 4 PRI 5
Delayed In Time
TN FN FP TP TN FP TN FP TN FP TN FP TN FP
Traces 22 7 221 212 8 115 0 19 19 121 0 2 3 25
% 76% 24% 51% 49% 28% 27% 0% 4% 66% 28% 0% 0.5% 10% 6%
Legend: TN—True Negatives; FN—False Negatives; FP—False Positives; TP—True Positives
on business performance can be very different. We can observe that the MAE for
delayed cases with 5 PRIs is 0.24, i.e., the predictor function estimated correctly
the outcome of 76% of delayed cases (“True Negatives” in Table 1). On the other
hand, the MAE for the cases that are not delayed is 0.51 (“False Positives” in
Table 1). From further analysis, we observed that 74% of the 221 cases that
were falsely predicted as delayed have durations that are very close to the cut-
off threshold (the difference is lower than 5% of assumed normal case duration).
From the individual PRI results, we can see that for this particular log almost all
predicted problems (“True Negatives” in Table 1) are based on observations of
PRIs 1, 3 and 5. We have also analysed the ability of PRIs to provide operational
support. For this particular event log, we were able to identify the presence of
PRIs 1, 3 and 4 early during a case’s execution, while PRIs 2 and 5 for most of
the cases could only be discovered after half of the normal case duration for the
run corresponding to that case had passed.
Table 1 focussed on the results from our first predictor function, G. We also
tested the weighted Score function (with wi = 1 for all PRIs) and found that for
most of the cases predicted as delayed just one of the indicators was discovered
(64% of correctly predicted cases and 76% of falsely predicted cases). This reveals
that the “suspicion” attached to these poor results of G was actually very low.
After examining the BPI Challenge event log we noted certain log charac-
teristics that may have influenced the presented results and discovered oppor-
tunities for the improvement of the risk identification method. The durations
of the cases assigned to a cluster did not significantly deviate from the cut-off
thresholds, thus there were very few outlier cases. Also, the number of traces in
some clusters were too small to get statistically significant results. Many activi-
ties have very small durations compared to the total case duration. Discarding
durations whose values are lower than some predefined threshold may help to
filter out false positive predictions. The event log used does not contain start
events recorded for all activities. To be able to work with the event logs that do
not contain start events we can use an indicator “PRI 6: Abnormal sub-process
duration” that considers both activity service and waiting time (sub-process du-
rations are calculated as the time difference between two consecutive complete
events). Applying PRI 6 and PRI 3 v.2 (that considers the absolute values of
repetition durations) we were able to correctly estimate the outcome of 86% of
delayed cases and 30% of cases in time were falsely predicted as delayed.
4 Conclusions
We have presented a new approach for predicting whether or not a case will meet
its deadline. We first defined relevant “Process Risk Indicators” and then used
statistical methods to identify their presence in event logs. Our initial results
indicate that further work is needed to properly calibrate the analysis, perhaps
on a process-specific basis, to minimise the annoyance of false-positive warnings
and the more serious threat of false-negative alert failures. (As noted above, the
data set available to us for experimentation was not well-suited to our purposes.
We have recently obtained a larger data set from an Insurance Company and will
use it for experiments.) Although we only focused on the risk of case overruns
in this paper, we believe that the overall strategy is suitable for any quantifiable
type of risk, such as financial losses or low-quality outputs.
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